readingomnivore
Well-Known Member
Erik Larson’s DEAD WAKE: THE LAST CROSSING OF THE LUSITANIA is an example of his doing popular history right. It was published in 2015. Its style is accessible, the research is impeccable, and notes and a eight-page bibliography provide ample material for readers who want more information. Much of the material is from primary sources. Larson is skilled in evoking character, including passengers on the Lusitania; his depiction of the vessels and Room 40 make them almost characters in the narrative.
The sinking of the Lusitania, one of the Cunard Line’s “greyhounds of the sea,” by a German submarine, the U-20, is well-known as one of the causes of American entry into World War I. On Friday, 7 May 1915, she was hit by one torpedo and sank in eighteen minutes; of 1,959 passengers and crew, there were 764 survivors. Of the dead, 123 were American citizens. The United States was officially a neutral in the war, and Great Britain needed American involvement. Earlier in 1915, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote Walter Runciman, head of England’s Board of Trade, that it was “ ‘most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores, in the hopes especially of embroiling the United States with Germany.’ After noting that Germany’s submarine campaign had sharply reduced traffic from America, Churchill told Runciman: ‘For our part, we want the traffic--the more the better; and if some of it gets into trouble, better still.’ “ (189-90) So was the Lusitania set up by the British Navy as a target for a German submarine, to provoke American entry into WWI?
Larson cuts between four locales in covering the story of the last crossing: the Lusitania, under experienced and capable Captain William Thomas Turner; the German submarine U-20, commanded by Kplt. Walther Schieger, dashing and ruthless; Washington, D.C., where President Woodrow Wilson is suffering first through the death of his wife, then his emerging courtship of Edith Galt, while dealing with the complications of neutrality in time of war; and Room 40, nerve center for the Admiralty, under Churchill and First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher. The existence of Room 40 was a closely guarded secret even within the Admiralty, to conceal that the Royal Navy had the German naval code and was routinely monitoring wireless communications to ship and submarines, tracking movements and orders. The key question is, what did Room 40 know, and was there a conscious decision to sacrifice the Lusitania?
There’s no question that the Admiralty tried to cover up its role in the disaster. Larson concludes: “At no time during the secret portion of the proceedings [inquiry headed by Lord Mersey] did the Admiralty ever reveal what it knew about the travels of U-20. Nor did it disclose the measures taken to protect the HMS Orion and other military vessels. Moreover, the Admiralty made no effort to correct Lord Mersey’s finding that the Lusitania had been struck by two torpedos--this despite the fact that Room 40 knew full well that Schwieger had fired only one. Nor did the inquiry ever delineate why the Lusitania wasn’t diverted to the safer North Channel route, and why no naval escort was provided. Indeed, these are the great lingering questions of the Lusitania affair: Why, given all the information possessed by the Admiralty about U-20; given the Admiralty’s past willingness to provide escorts to inbound ships or divert them away from trouble; given that the ship carried a vital cargo of rifle ammunition and shrapnel shell; given that Room 40’s intelligence prompted the obsessive tracking and protection of the HMS Orion; given that U-20 had sank three vessels in the Lusitania’s path; given Cunard chairman Booth’s panicked Friday morning visit to the navy’s Queenstown office; given that the new and safer North Channel route was available; and given that passengers and crew alike had expected to be convoyed o Liverpool by the Royal Navy--the question remains, why was the ship left on its own, with a proven killer of men and ships dead ahead in its path? There is silence on the subject in the records of Room 40 held by the National Archives of the United Kingdom and Churchill College, Cambridge. Nowhere is there even a hint of dismay at missing so clear an opportunity to use the fruits of Room 40’ intelligence to save a thousand lives.” (323)
Room 40’s actions appear a forecast of the World War II decision to allow the unopposed bombing of Coventry, to conceal that the British had broken and was reading German Enigma codes. That decision was made by Winston Churchill.
I recommend DEAD WAKE highly. (solid A)
edited to change date--1915 for the sinking is a bit more accurate than this year. DUH!
The sinking of the Lusitania, one of the Cunard Line’s “greyhounds of the sea,” by a German submarine, the U-20, is well-known as one of the causes of American entry into World War I. On Friday, 7 May 1915, she was hit by one torpedo and sank in eighteen minutes; of 1,959 passengers and crew, there were 764 survivors. Of the dead, 123 were American citizens. The United States was officially a neutral in the war, and Great Britain needed American involvement. Earlier in 1915, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote Walter Runciman, head of England’s Board of Trade, that it was “ ‘most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores, in the hopes especially of embroiling the United States with Germany.’ After noting that Germany’s submarine campaign had sharply reduced traffic from America, Churchill told Runciman: ‘For our part, we want the traffic--the more the better; and if some of it gets into trouble, better still.’ “ (189-90) So was the Lusitania set up by the British Navy as a target for a German submarine, to provoke American entry into WWI?
Larson cuts between four locales in covering the story of the last crossing: the Lusitania, under experienced and capable Captain William Thomas Turner; the German submarine U-20, commanded by Kplt. Walther Schieger, dashing and ruthless; Washington, D.C., where President Woodrow Wilson is suffering first through the death of his wife, then his emerging courtship of Edith Galt, while dealing with the complications of neutrality in time of war; and Room 40, nerve center for the Admiralty, under Churchill and First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher. The existence of Room 40 was a closely guarded secret even within the Admiralty, to conceal that the Royal Navy had the German naval code and was routinely monitoring wireless communications to ship and submarines, tracking movements and orders. The key question is, what did Room 40 know, and was there a conscious decision to sacrifice the Lusitania?
There’s no question that the Admiralty tried to cover up its role in the disaster. Larson concludes: “At no time during the secret portion of the proceedings [inquiry headed by Lord Mersey] did the Admiralty ever reveal what it knew about the travels of U-20. Nor did it disclose the measures taken to protect the HMS Orion and other military vessels. Moreover, the Admiralty made no effort to correct Lord Mersey’s finding that the Lusitania had been struck by two torpedos--this despite the fact that Room 40 knew full well that Schwieger had fired only one. Nor did the inquiry ever delineate why the Lusitania wasn’t diverted to the safer North Channel route, and why no naval escort was provided. Indeed, these are the great lingering questions of the Lusitania affair: Why, given all the information possessed by the Admiralty about U-20; given the Admiralty’s past willingness to provide escorts to inbound ships or divert them away from trouble; given that the ship carried a vital cargo of rifle ammunition and shrapnel shell; given that Room 40’s intelligence prompted the obsessive tracking and protection of the HMS Orion; given that U-20 had sank three vessels in the Lusitania’s path; given Cunard chairman Booth’s panicked Friday morning visit to the navy’s Queenstown office; given that the new and safer North Channel route was available; and given that passengers and crew alike had expected to be convoyed o Liverpool by the Royal Navy--the question remains, why was the ship left on its own, with a proven killer of men and ships dead ahead in its path? There is silence on the subject in the records of Room 40 held by the National Archives of the United Kingdom and Churchill College, Cambridge. Nowhere is there even a hint of dismay at missing so clear an opportunity to use the fruits of Room 40’ intelligence to save a thousand lives.” (323)
Room 40’s actions appear a forecast of the World War II decision to allow the unopposed bombing of Coventry, to conceal that the British had broken and was reading German Enigma codes. That decision was made by Winston Churchill.
I recommend DEAD WAKE highly. (solid A)
edited to change date--1915 for the sinking is a bit more accurate than this year. DUH!
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